The topic of submarine cables has been recurring in newspapers and TV for several months: from the damages recorded in the Baltic Sea (where possible sabotage is suspected) to continuous references to hybrid warfare or “suspicious” ships that might be deliberately cutting cables. In reality, attention to the “Internet sea” isn’t new at all: underwater infrastructure has existed for decades and has guaranteed the circulation of most global traffic for years. It’s only now, however, that public opinion is truly beginning to realize how intimately the sea and connectivity are linked.
Most of what we do online – watching streaming videos, sending emails, participating in international video calls, shopping online – passes through submarine cables. These are fiber optic networks, protected by layers of metal and special plastics to withstand pressures, currents, and (to a lesser extent) even “curious” attacks from marine fauna.
According to many estimates, these cables carry up to 95-97% of global data traffic. When they’re damaged by natural causes or trawling accidents, a phenomenon similar to highway construction occurs: traffic diverts to other routes, slowdowns occur, and the online experience becomes less smooth. It’s rare for a single cable interruption to completely block the Internet because redundant connections and automatic rebalancing systems exist (just like alternative exits on highways). Remember the resilient nature of the Internet: originally, the DARPA project aimed to build a network capable of surviving even a nuclear disaster. And it partly succeeded: today, data can follow alternative paths if one node is interrupted. But this doesn’t make everything simple: like on a highway with only one free lane due to construction, you can still pass through, but at reduced speeds and with greater risks of congestion. Then there are the costs: repairing a submarine cable break can take from 5 to 20 days or more, and the costs are not insignificant.
How vulnerable are we, and how do sabotages impact the network? Statistics say that about 60% of breaks are caused by fishing activities or improper anchoring, another 10-15% comes from natural events (landslides, earthquakes), while another 10-15% involves technical defects and wear. Less than 5% of cases are attributable to intentional tampering. Not much in absolute terms, but enough to frighten governments and companies, especially if a vital cable for an entire nation is damaged in a geopolitically sensitive context, like in the Red Sea or Baltic Sea.
Parallel to recent alarms, it’s interesting to note how the connection between “network and sea” in Italy has roots almost 30 years old, albeit in a decidedly more “romantic” way than one might think. Just look at the history of NAMEX, Rome’s Internet Exchange Point (IXP), which reveals its “submarine” spirit right in its name.
When thinking of the most famous IXPs, usually their acronym recalls the host city: AMS-IX (Amsterdam), LINX (London), DEC-IX (Germany/Frankfurt), ESPANIX (Spain/Madrid). So why isn’t Rome’s IXP called “ROM-IX” or “ITA-IX”?
We need to go back to 1995, when Internet in Italy was still a niche phenomenon. The idea of an exchange point was considered pioneering, almost “underground”: few emails, the first institutional websites, some enterprise applications. At that time, Rome’s Municipality server was under a researcher’s desk at Sapienza University. It was in this “artisanal” climate that the founding group chose to call the nascent exchange point Nautilus Mediterranean Exchange Point.
The name recalled the Nautilus from Jules Verne’s Twenty Thousand Leagues Under the Sea: a futuristic vessel, symbol of innovation and push toward the unknown. Not coincidentally, in Verne’s writings, the Nautilus was equipped with an advanced form of electrical energy capable of powering every aspect of life aboard. It was 1870.
“At that moment, I saw Captain Nemo, standing by the helm wheel, leaning on a control bench. His gaze was fixed, far into the abyss. Electricity, aboard that incredible vessel, not only powered the engine but every corner of light and life; a dream of modernity, realized and maintained with stubborn determination.”
This spirit of discovery perfectly reflected the enthusiasm of those trying to birth the Internet in Italy in the 90s. Another insight of the founders was not to limit the vision to Rome or Italy but to aim from the start for an interconnection hub that would extend beyond Rome and serve the entire Mediterranean area.
The Baltic Sea Events
Between November 17 and 18, 2024, two submarine cables – C-Lion1 connecting Finland to Germany and BCS EAST-WEST connecting Sweden and Lithuania – were damaged. How is this discovered in real-time? Anyone managing international IP traffic sees the route changes, users might notice slowdowns, and then there are probes, like those from RIPE ATLAS that notice significantly changed latency, or other monitoring companies like Kentik from our friend Doug Madory. How do we distinguish accidental causes from malicious ones? This is where complex investigative activity begins. Initially, if there are no known events in the area, ships are immediately monitored. Through sites like Marine Traffic or others, ship traffic in the area can be tracked, especially fishing vessels or those of significant size. The chains of some cargo ships exceed 300 meters in length. The final word can’t come before the repair moment, which means days, but generally weeks later. That’s when the type of damage is seen, but the who/what/how is still to be explored. In the Baltic case, on the same day, there were a series of statements from local government political representatives pointing to the Russian government as the mastermind of the alleged sabotage. In the following days, Danish, Swedish, and German authorities detained the Chinese ship Yi Peng 3 coming from a Russian port. According to Marine Traffic data, the ship’s positions were compatible with cable intersections. After a few weeks, on December 15, the Wall Street Journal reported that according to Western intelligence sources, the Yi Peng 3’s captain “was induced by Russian intelligence” to drop anchor on the seabed and deliberately drag it for dozens of miles. The German Coast Guard, after examining the C-Lion 1 cable, confirmed that the observed damage was consistent with that caused by a dragged anchor, and a deep groove appeared on the seabed. I note that American authorities have stated the cable “was not deliberately cut,” while European ones continue to point fingers at Russia.
To this hypothesis of induced sabotage, as described, we must add a further problem in the Baltic that could lead to submarine cable breaks as collateral damage from ships in distress. With sanctions, Russian oil tankers have increased, which to circumvent blocks fly different flags, turn off AIS, or use jammers to confuse the coast guard and traffic oil. It’s called the ghost fleet. The writer’s feeling is that we’ll hear about it for a long time to come.
The Role of Fiumicino
Does it make sense to continue installing submarine cables? Absolutely yes. Especially to guarantee redundancy and resilience, two fundamental aspects if we consider that technological “shortcuts,” satellites, which are much talked about, have other advantages and are not without risks. Since 2021, Russia, unfortunately always Russia, can shoot down satellites directly from the ground.
Starting from the end of January, the implementation phases of the Unitirreno submarine cable from the Italian consortium of the same name will begin, connecting Mazara del Vallo, Olbia, Fiumicino, and will land at the Genoa landing station in the first half of 2025.
Unitirreno is the second cable of international strategic importance landing on Lazio’s coasts. The other is BluMed by Sparkle, a leading Italian company in the sector.
Focusing on submarine cables remains a sensible choice, and Italy, with Unitirreno and BluMed, wants to carve out a leading role.
For now, and hopefully for long, the Tyrrhenian Sea should be less subject to “sabotage inductions.” And the docking of such a crucial cable in Fiumicino will make Rome a new telematic epicenter of the Mediterranean. A dream (or perhaps a solid vision) that NAMEX’s founders had already imagined long ago.
https://labs.ripe.net/author/emileaben/does-the-internet-route-around-damage-baltic-sea-cable-cuts/
https://www.ilpost.it/2024/11/30/indagini-sabotaggio-cavi-sottomarini-baltico/
—BY Christian Cinetto, Head of Communication and Content di Namex
